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A U T H O R

Jenna Brashear

I

am a junior majoring in International Studies and
German with a minor in Music Performance. I
am a Singletary Scholar, a Chellgren Fellow, and a
Gaines Fellow, as well as a student Vice President
of the recently inaugurated UK chapter of Phi Kappa
Phi. I serve as an executive board member for SPUR,
the Society for the Promotion of Undergraduate Research.
Before writing this paper on capital punishment and
women, I conducted research on the death penalty
and international norms, which I presented at the
Showcase of Undergraduate Scholars at UK, Posters-at-the-Capitol in
Frankfort, the Southern Regional Honors Conference in St. Petersburg,
Florida, and at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research in La
Crosse, Wisconsin. After graduating in 2010, I hope to attend law school,
one reason for my interest in the death penalty. The following paper was
written for Prof. Srimati Basu’s GWS 600 course on law and women. I
am particularly grateful to Prof. Basu for introducing me to women’s
issues and providing constant support throughout the class and the paper.

Gender and Capital
Punishment: The
Case of Gaile Owens

Abstract:

Faculty Mentor: Professor Srimati Basu
Department of Gender and Women’s Studies
Jenna Brashear’s paper “Gender and Capital Punishment: The Case of Gaile
Owens” carries my highest recommendation for consideration to be published
in Kaleidoscope. The paper raises provocative questions for jurisprudence
and feminist theory; draws substantively on research in Political Science,
Women’s Studies, and Law; and includes original, close analysis of a legal
case. As a paper that is strong on research as well as argument, structure,
and analysis, it is an excellent candidate for inclusion in an undergraduate
research journal. Jenna wrote this paper as the one undergraduate student
in a graduate seminar focused on feminist jurisprudence, heavy on legal
and cultural theory, and was among the most keen analytical and diligent
readers in the class. The paper reflects her depth of understanding in these
issues and her attempt to leave her own mark within this body of work, and
thus also exemplifies undergraduate academic engagement and excellence.
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The United States’ use of capital punishment is a
practice oft-debated in many disciplines, but the
gender imbalance of the death penalty in favor
of women makes feminists one group hesitant to
discuss the practice. Although females account for
one in ten murder arrests, they are only one percent
of the criminals actually executed. This paper
examines the implications of capital punishment for
women, and attempts to explain why women are
executed at a disproportionately low rate. Trends
that emerge include institutional structures, such
as aggravating or mitigating factors, which are
constructed in a manner that dictates the severest
punishments for male crimes. Additionally, social
ideologies and stereotypes are often reinforced
during trials and sentencing, when judges and
juries tell us directly and implicitly that women are
simply too good, fair, and delicate to commit such
heinous crimes. All of these elements contribute
to the low rates of capital sentences and executions
for female criminals. This paper includes analysis
of feminist thought on capital punishment and the
state, namely the works of Elizabeth Rapaport,
Renee Heberle, Wendy Brown, and Wendy
Williams. Finally, these theories are applied to
the case of Owens v. Guida, which illustrates
how far a woman must reach outside of societal
norms to be sentenced to death and executed.

Introduction:
In traditional feminist discourse, common issues
include marriage, reproduction and pregnancy,
equality in the workplace, and the position of
such social institutions with regard to masculine
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systems of law. For the great majority of these
instances, the women studied are disadvantaged —
held in limiting roles such as housewives, underpaid
in comparison to their male counterparts, and
discriminated against either directly or subtly by policies
created for the societal “norm,” who is most often a man.
There are, however, a few rare instances in which
women can be seen as benefitting from the stereotypical
traits from which they often attempt to break free. The
classic example of this is the military draft, a process
that defies gender equality. What is the state saying
when drafting men to war and leaving women at home?
It would be hard to argue that traditional gender roles
were not reinforced by the draft. Another lesser-known
practice that is gender imbalanced is that of capital
punishment, and the practice brings many of the same
questions to the surface. What does it say about law
and culture in the United States that we execute men at a
much higher rate than women? The statistical disparities
in capital punishment between men and women and the
issues of state and societal complicity with the imbalance
are not often placed within the feminist framework
and, therefore, that is what I will attempt to do.
Although capital punishment is not illegal,
meaning it does not exclude women totally as the
draft does, courts in the United States are much less
willing to sentence women to death and, through
the appellate and death row processes, women are
disproportionately removed from the figurative guillotine
as compared to men. Victor Streib provides the following
statistics in his report “The Death Penalty for Female
Offenders, January 1, 1973 Through December 31,
2007:” though one in ten murder arrests are women,
they comprise only one in 50 capital sentences, only
one in 67 death row prisoners, and only 1 in 100 of
those “actually executed in the modern era” (2008, p. 3).
In the following essay, I will examine the use of
the death penalty for women in the United States in a
general context as well as from a feminist viewpoint. I
will examine gender discrepancies in greater depth and
attempt to explain why the state does not wish to execute
women in the United States. In addition to attempting
to make sense of alarming statistics, I have chosen a
2008 case to analyze involving capital punishment for
a woman, Owens v. Guida. The language the three
judges choose to articulate their opinions in this case
is just as relevant as the statistics. With this paper I
hope to extend common feminist issues and questions,
such as how women’s social identities carry over into
the legal realm. Are women simply viewed to be too
delicate to be put in the electric chair or injected with
the lethal three-drug cocktail? Do we believe them
incapable of acts of such violence and aggression?
These are the types of questions I will try to answer.
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Why Capital Punishment
Is Structured in Favor of Women:
The Work of Victor Streib
Not only does capital punishment for women lie outside
of the usual feminist discussions, it is also something
of an anomaly within mainstream death penalty
discourse. One of the strongest arguments against capital
punishment as a whole is the effectual discrimination
that occurs. Only 57% of those executed since 1976
have been white, while 34% were black and 7% were
Hispanic (Death Penalty Information Center Race,
2009). Moreover, black men who allegedly killed white
victims comprise 235 of the executions in the same time
period, although only 15 white defendants with black
victims were executed. Within the population of women
executed, the racial element is basically erased. Of the 11
women executed since 1976, only two have been black
(DPIC Women, 2009). The remaining nine were white.

Perhaps somewhat due to the attention given
to race, gender and capital punishment is almost
ignored. Writings on the subject are largely legal,
statistical, or anecdotal. There are essays on whether
or not women’s support for the death penalty is
different from men’s (Durham, et al., 1996; and
Whitehead, et al., 2000); analyses of how men and
women are victimized differently (Gartner, et al.,
1990); and stories of executed women (Gillespie,
2000). There are statistical analyses such as O’Shea’s
Women and the Death Penalty in the United States,
1900-1998 (1999), and regional accounts such as
Streib’s The Fairer Death: Executing Women in Ohio
(2006) and Reza’s “Gender Bias in North Carolina’s
Death Penalty” (2005). Despite all of this, feminists
have been relatively unwilling to tackle this subject.
Rapaport (1991), whose analysis I will include
later, says that this reluctance is due to a hesitance
to campaign to kill more women. I will return to
these issues later, but start now with more on the
background of gender and capital punishment itself.
The aforementioned large racial disparity is but
one reason to which Streib (2002) is referring in the
introduction of his analysis, when he says that the “death
penalty system” in America is one that “continues to
carry the heavy burdens of intense political agendas” (p.
1). He argues quite rightly that the questions regarding
capital punishment are not ones of justice, but “whether
we can trust this hodgepodge of local, state, and federal
government” methods to ensure procedural justice (p. 1).
With regard to women, Streib says that jury selection
processes do not ask questions about biases in favor
of women, and research has indicated that juries are
slanted toward female defendants (p. 1). The death
penalty arena itself is what Streib calls a “masculine
sanctuary” because “typical macho posturing over the
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death penalty is disrupted and confused
when the murderer is a murderess” (p. 2).
Capital crimes are, when viewed as norms,
distinctly male norms, and Streib argues
this is true of the behavior regardless
of the sex of the perpetrator (p. 2).
In order to find patterns, Streib
examined capital sentences from 1973
forward, the significance of the date
being that it was the first time when
the information about them became
normalized. I gave earlier statistics on the
rate of incidence, but it is interesting to look
more closely at the 138 women sentenced
to death from 1973 to 2001. A paltry 5%
(seven women) were actually executed,
while 79 sentences were commuted or
reversed, leaving only 52 on death row
(Streib, 2002, p. 2). Geographically, the
sentences came from 23 states, with
the largest numbers coming from North
Carolina (16), Florida (15), California,
(14), and, of course, Texas (13) (Streib,
2002, p. 3). Harries and Cheatwood (1997)
note that for those actually executed, the
geographical distribution for males and
females is basically the same (pp. 78-93).
Streib describes the historical trajectory

Figure 1: Karla Faye Tucker, executed
2/3/98.
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of two states, Virginia and Ohio, which
executed many female offenders until 1912
and 1954 respectively, but notes that as a
whole, the pattern is unchanged and even
in the Colonial period, female executions
were less than 3% (2002, pp. 3, 6).
In detailing some of the executions
that have taken place during the period,
Streib notes in particular Karla Faye Tucker
(Figure 1), the woman who is arguably
the face associated with women and
execution. Streib writes that even though
she had a history of violent behavior and
her crime was aggressive and masculine,
her status as an “attractive, photogenic,
articulate white woman undoubtedly
contributed to both the extensive media
coverage and to the reluctance of the
system to carry through to the end: (2002,
p. 9). Then Texas Governor George W.
Bush had executed more than 130 people,
but none of those subjected him to so
much turmoil as the case of Tucker (2002,
p. 9). The rate of executions from 1990 to
1997 had dropped to 0.5% but the Tucker
case seemed to revitalize the punishment
for women (2002, p. 9). Tucker’s execution
in 1998 was the first of a woman in Texas
since 1863 and the first in the United States
since 1984. Tucker’s crime was a violation
of society’s norms and expectations, due
to her (born again) Christian persona, her
physical beauty, and her femininity, but her
execution was controversial and debated
throughout the world.
More important than the statistics
are what Streib identifies as institutional
means of sex bias. The first of those is the
crimes selected for capital punishment.
Domestic homicide, for example, is
considered less serious and punishments
are not as harsh (2002, p. 11). One of
the most common death row crimes
is felony murder, meaning homicide
performed during the commission of a
felony such as rape, and women’s murders
are less likely to be in such a category.
Streib returns to domestic murder with
infanticide as a further example of
women’s position; women are rarely
executed for killing their children (2002,
p. 11). In his studied time frame, only
one of seven women sentenced to die for
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killing her children was actually executed;
Streib is particularly uncomfortable with
this idea, because “the broad negative
impact of infanticide upon an entire
community typically is more severe than
for most other homicides” (2002, p. 11).
In addition to sentencing, Streib
looks at how aggravating and mitigating
circumstances impact women:
This final choice between the
death sentence and life in prison
focuses both upon the nature and
circumstances of the crime and
upon the character and background
of the person who committed that
crime. Regardless of the seriousness
of the crime, it cannot automatically
result in the death penalty. The
personal characteristics of the
convicted murderer also must
be weighed in the balance. This
is where the sex of the offender
can come into play, probably
unintentionally, but nonetheless
with important consequences. As
is explained below, this sex-specific
impact may either favor or disfavor
female capital defendants (STREIB,
2002, pp. 11-12).
One typical aggravating
circumstance is murder for hire,
and women more often hire killers;
Gaile Owens is one example, and I
will discuss her case in more depth
later (Streib, 2002, p. 12).
Another is a criminal record
of violence, including violent
felonies, and in this category
women are less likely than men
to have committed aggravating
crimes. Felony murder is a third
usual aggravating circumstance,
and it is more likely to affect men.
Mitigating circumstances have the
opposite effect of aggravating and
are more likely to prevent a capital
sentence. They include emotional
distress or domination by another,
elements that judges and jurors are
more likely to detect in the histories
of women (Streib, 2002, p.13).
The last method of institutional
inequity is jury selection, especially
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important because juries are normally involved
in sentencing in capital cases. Though federal
capital cases take sex bias into account, state
processes are less likely to do so, giving yet
another advantage to women (Streib, 2002, p. 14).

Feminism, the State, and Capital
Punishment: Rapaport, Heberle,
Brown, and Williams
Feminism is uncomfortable with the idea of capital
punishment and, as I mentioned in the introduction, this
is probably because, when viewing capital punishment
as a negative consequence of behavior outside the norms
of society, women are spared from this punishment as
compared to men. This fact is not justification for the
lack of willingness on the part of feminists to address
this subject. Without advocating for a change in the
rules or for the execution of more women, we should
examine why the death penalty is structured to benefit
women. We should also determine if these practices
are discriminatory in intent and whether or not the
advantageous position of women can be replicated
elsewhere without undue discrimination against men.
Through a feminist lens, I am seeking to discover whether
institutional framework exists to say something negative
or positive about women, though anyone familiar with
feminism could probably guess which result is most likely.
Elizabeth Rapaport addresses this issue when she
admits that discovery of the roots of gender imbalance
in capital punishment could be viewed as an attempt
“to exterminate a few more wretched sisters” (1991,
p. 368). She takes issue with this, however, and says
that the disparities in death penalty sentencing are
more related to our differing societal standards of
responsibility for men and women, meaning men are
considered to be capable of being more responsible
(1991, p. 368). Rapaport uses similar statistics to
Streib to show the characteristics of male and female
murderers, including the types of crimes given capital
punishment and mitigating and aggravating factors
(1991, pp. 369-374). She remarks almost happily that
rather than “chivalrous regard for the female sex,” the
disparities can be attributed to who the victims are and
how background information is presented at trial (1991,
p. 374). Afterwards Rapaport sets out to discover how
men and women arrive at death row. One variable that
she examines is “the pattern among murder suspects,”
using North Carolina as her base (1991, p. 375). Twelve
percent of death row males in North Carolina had
killed intimates, whereas 49 percent of females had
(Rapaport, 1991, p. 375). As a society, we appear to
perceive women to be killing other criminals when
their victims are abusive husbands or fellow inmates.
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Lastly, Rapaport studies what she calls “gender
interpretation of the conception of offense seriousness,”
beginning with categories of murder (1991, p. 376).
The three categories eligible for the death penalty
include predatory murder, i.e., murder for some
type of gain; murder that impedes law enforcement
or other government; and murders of excessive
violence. Thus, categories singled out for capital
punishment do not include the aforementioned
intimate murder necessarily. She says eloquently:
But the paradigmatic domestic killing, arising
out of hot anger at someone who is capable, as
it were by definition, of calling out painful and
sudden emotion in his or her killer, is virtually
the antithesis of capital murder (1991, p. 378).
She argues along Streib’s lines that some of these
crimes are the most alarming and undermine the value
of the home (1991, p. 378). Her departure from Streib
is when she inserts this into the feminist framework.
Though she does not argue for the death penalty as
a whole, she does enter the controversial territory of
advocating harsher punishment for domestic crimes,
i.e., female crimes. Women are more likely to kill and
be killed by intimates, and familial crimes such as
these, especially when a child enters the picture, are
the ones for which Rapaport argues changes in policy.
One suggestion is to raise severe and routine
abuse of a husband, wife, or child to felony status in
order to make those perpetrators eligible for felony
murder (Rapaport, 1991, p. 379). This suggestion only
tangentially affects the sentencing of women, but the
elevation of domestic non-capital crimes could move
the capital punishment practices as well. It is at this
point that Rapaport addresses three anticipated feminist
criticisms. The first, that domestic violence is often
“victim-precipitated” and that we should view victims as
worthy of part of the blame, is discounted by Rapaport for
being unable to account for the killing of a child (1991,
p. 380). The second is that the planning and calculating
murderer is more worthy of scorn than the passionate
killer, another distinction that does not adequately
prioritize responses to spousal or child abuse (1991,

p. 381). Lastly, she says that the feminist viewpoint
does not recognize the susceptibility of passion crimes
to death penalty due to the deterrence argument
(1991, p. 381). Rapaport ends by reiterating that her
primary goal is “to expose the ideological biases of
the status quo in which domestic homicide is treated,
invidiously, as almost always less reprehensible
than predatory murder” (1991, p. 381). She says,
moreover, “we have no credible evidence that
women are spared the death penalty in circumstances
where it would be pronounced on men;” rather, it is “a
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that the state is a male power in subtle and
overt ways. For the sake of brevity, I will
limit this discussion to the liberal modality,
in which I believe capital punishment
and its strange relationship with women
fall. Liberal thinking divides society into
domestic, economic, and governmental
sections. Women fall into the domestic
sphere and, once there, can scarcely
escape.
The private domain of the home is
neither private nor safe for women (Brown,
1992, p. 18). Brown posits that rights
do not really exist there, but instead the
area is “governed by norms of duty, love,
and custom, and until quite recently, has
been largely shielded from the reach of
law” (1992, p. 18). This is, in theory, the
gap of which Rapaport speaks, the realm
that contains both individual and privacy
rights, a juxtaposition that the state has
difficulty reconciling. For women, the
group disproportionately affected by
domestic crimes, this liberal posturing is
problematic.
Another general feminist approach
that could be applied is that of Wendy
Williams, who critiques women’s positions
with regard to the courts. In an era when

Tennessee Department of Corrections

question of social ideology” (1991, p. 382).
Renee Heberle agrees that it is social
ideology, and she writes that it is society
that “wonders whether women, as women,
need to be rendered more commonly
subject to the disciplinary sanctions of the
state, not in the name of equality but in the
name of managing the disorder engendered
by unequal relations of power” (Heberle,
1999, p. 1104). She suggests that the
focus should not be on the statistics but
instead on gender expectations and norms
(1999, p. 1104). The question she poses
is whether or not, as others have asked,
femininity and the traits we associate with
such an abstract concept are themselves
enough to protect women from harsh
criminal punishment.
Herberle departs from Rapaport at the
point of deciding where the significance
lies in the gendering of intimate murder,
arguing that the imbalance is instead
between civil and domestic spheres,
causing asymmetry with respect to the
sexes. As an example, she says that men
acting violently in the home are only
acting according to societal expectations,
whereas women behaving similarly have
to be punished or “re-feminized” (1999,
p. 1105). Thus, contrary to Rapaport,
Heberle believes death row is home not
to the most deserving and despicable
criminals, but rather a population that is
reconstructing social hierarchies. Most
importantly, Heberle believes that women
are the ones exempt from death row
because they “have a kind of escape route
in appropriately feminine behavior” (199,
p. 1108). Karla Faye Tucker is mentioned
again, this time as an example of someone
outside feminine norms. Even though she
was converted by religion, she could not
overcome her former comment that she
had orgasms when she hit her victims.
This, Heberle observes, is a dramatic action
that inverted expectations of gender.
Heberle believes that the dichotomies
she explored were examples of the liberal
state; Wendy Brown is one feminist who
has explored theories of the state and
norms that the resultant institutions
have constructed. There are four specific
models that she analyzes: liberal, capitalist,
prerogative, and bureaucratic. She argues

Figure 2: A recent mugshot of Gaile Owens,
whose lawyers were still in the appeals
process in February 2010, attempting to
have her sentence commuted from the
death penalty to life imprisonment.

2 0 0 9

women are guaranteed equal rights, the
equality is equal to men, so the rights
afforded to women by the government are
at best male rights (1997, p. 71). Williams
looks at equality issues such as the military
draft, and writes on the inherent troubles
with associating men with war and sex
and women with whatever is opposite,
namely as “[mothers] of humanity”
(1997, p. 78). Much of Williams’ article
is a debate between special rights and
equality treatment, and she sides with
equality treatment. The true issue is
characterizations of males and females,
and she argues that gender roles should
be complementary in light of all of these
problems, rather than explicitly equal
(1997, p. 84). With these arguments and
perspectives in mind, it is time to look at
how the law affected one woman.

Owens v. Guida Background
Of the eleven women currently on death
row, six killed a boyfriend, significant
other, or husband, a statistic worthy of its
own research (DPIC Women, 2009). For
the time being, however, we will focus
on one of those women. Gaile K. Owens
(Figure 2) was sentenced to death in
Tennessee after hiring Sidney Porterfield
to kill her husband. All of the following
information and quotes are taken from
the text of the appellate decision; the case
was heard in the United States Court of
Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which includes
Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Michigan.
I chose Gaile Owens’ case because of her
interesting story, its relative obscurity,
especially compared to the case of Karla
Faye Tucker, and for its illustration of the
arguments noted above. Owens’ case
shows many of the unique situations that
lead women to death row, and thus helps
to answer the question, “What does it take
for a woman to be sentenced to death?”
In 1985, Owens interviewed several
hit men with the purpose of hiring one to
kill Ronald Owens. Trial evidence showed
that she met with the eventual hit man,
Sidney Porterfield, on a minimum of three
occasions. On February 17, 1985, Ronald
Owens was found in the Owens’ den with
his skill crushed from what the coroner
determined was a minimum of 21 blows
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of a tire iron. The beating was so forceful that bone
chips from his skull had been lodged in his brain “and
his face had been driven into the floor.” There was
blood on the walls and floor, and the condition of his
hands, according to pathology, suggested he had been
trying to shield his face from the blows of the tire iron.
Upon the discovery of Owens’ body and the public
revelation of the crime, one of the other men solicited
by Gaile Owens, George James, went to the police out
of anxiety that he might be suspected in the murder.
He agreed to meet with Owens and wear a wire. In
this meeting, she “explained that she had her husband
killed because of ‘bad marital problems’ and paid James
$60 to keep quiet.” Owens and Porterfield eventually
confessed to their respective crimes, and Porterfield
stated that Owens volunteered $17,000 for the job. He
also gave more details on how he beat Mr. Owens to
death, from an initial confrontation in the backyard
that continued into the house. Gaile Owens said that
“that she had Ronald killed because ‘we’ve just had a
bad marriage over the years, and I just felt like he had
been cruel to me. There was little physical violence.’”
The jury found Owens guilty of murder and murderfor-hire and “a murder that was ‘especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.’” She and Porterfield were both
sentenced to death. They appealed to the Tennessee
Supreme Court and lost, and then continued appeals
through various channels. The following majority and
dissenting opinions illuminate the factors that Streib
and Rapaport elucidated, including mitigating and
aggravating factors. The technical functions of these
judicial particularities often serve to shield women
from capital punishment. In the case of Owens,
however, she and/or her counsel did almost everything
wrong if their aim was to avoid the death penalty.

Majority Opinion
On the first claim, that her attorneys had not properly
investigated or presented mitigating evidence, the court
ruled that the performance of Owens’ attorneys was not
deficient. One of the bases of their argument was that
her unwillingness to cooperate had complicated the
mitigation process, because she would not testify or allow
family or mental health examiners to do so. “A defendant
cannot be permitted to manufacture a winning IAC
[inadequate assistance of counsel] claim by sabotaging
her own defense, or else every defendant clever enough
to thwart her own attorneys would be able to overturn
her sentence on appeal.” The court supported this ruling
with evidence from the same circuit, using male clients.
The court wrote that the whole of her COA (Court
of Appeals) claim was in essence a claim that she should
have had battered-wife defense. This was refuted by
the fact that her attorneys had considered both that
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defense and an insanity plea. The implausibility of
an insanity plea was refuted by the testimony of two
jail employees, who testified “that she was a model
prisoner.” Another inefficiency component of Owens’s
appeal was regarding the inability of her defense to
surmount the prosecution’s hearsay objection to Dr.
Max West’s testimony. Though West had spent an
hour with Owens, he was not allowed to testify about
her family history. During sentencing, Dr. Max West,
a psychiatrist testified for Owens, saying that he, a
psychiatrist, had seen her in 1978 for behavioral issues.
In the end, West’s only basic testimony was that
Owens had “some kind of severe problem.” The appellate
court found that a statute existed that could have allowed
this testimony, but it was not cited by the counsel, and
because this “decision was a legitimate strategic” one, the
appellate court ruled it was not harmful to Owens. Owens
argument was that, had West been allowed to testify:
He would have said that Owens told him
that: 1) her parents were too hard on her; 2)
she was forced to care for a mentally retarded
brother; 3) her parents habitually lied to each
other and to the children; 4) she never felt like
she was needed; and 5) she had a ‘fairly severe
characterological [sic] or personality disorder.’
Her counsel argued that they were afraid that
West would have testified to, among other things, the
reason why she had seen him, which was that she
embezzled money. Lastly, the court determined that
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) was not violated
in refusing to turn over cards and love notes between
Ronald Owens and his lover Gala Scott. Brady found that
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused who has requested it violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.” (pp. 86-88) However, the appeals court
decision argued that Mrs. Owens could have introduced
other evidence about the affair, an example being that
she could have subpoenaed Scott. All of these issues are
ones of mitigation and illustrate the need for Owens to
establish a motive and illustrate the types of problems she
had faced that would have led her to kill her husband.
Also at issue was Owens’s willingness to accept the
initial plea deal of life imprisonment. The condition was
that she and Porterfield must both accept, and she wanted
her prior cooperation to be presented in court. The
appellate court upheld the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
determination that a prior decision, Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978), made her plea-bargaining irrelevant to
her sentencing. In reference to Lockett, the court stated
“no court, let alone the Supreme Court, has held that
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failed plea negotiations may be admitted at
a penalty-phase hearing.” On the subject,
the court wrote further that Owens’s “best
argument is that the evidence is relevant to
the positive character trait of ‘acceptance
of responsibility.’” Even here, she is
deemed a failure by the court because she
did not offer an unconditional guilty plea
in its place. They wrote, “Thus, she was
less interested in accepting responsibility
and more interested in avoiding the
electric chair, a motivation that is much
less persuasive as a mitigating factor.”
The court determined that it was not a
violation of federal law to prohibit the
introduction of her willingness to accept
the plea bargain.
In summation, the court wrote:
First, the entire premise of the
dissent’s rhetoric is that counsel
were obviously incompetent for
not relying on what is called, in
parts of both my state and that of
the dissenter, the ‘he just needed
killing’ defense. While it could be
true that a counsel of the dissenter’s
skill could have sold a jury on that
defense, there are many reasons
that counsel making such a choice
is the essence of a ‘strategic’ choice.
Here, the court asserted that
she calculatedly interviewed hit men
possibilities, and gave Porterfield the
necessary information that enabled
him to violently kill Ronald Owens.
Thus, the majority (Chief Justice
Boggs and Justice Siler) affirmed
the decision of the district court to
deny Owens’s habeas corpus petition.

Dissent
Of the three-judge panel, Judge Merritt
dissented, writing that “the majority
opinion slants and misconceives relevant
facts and law in this case on the three
major issues in order to uphold the death
penalty.” He wrote that his dissent “[tries]
to straighten out the case for the reader
by introducing the actual facts and the
correct legal principles to be applied.”
The facts about [Ronald]
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Owens’s cruel and sadistic behavior
toward his wife now make an
overwhelming case of domestic
violence and psychological abuse
in mitigation of the murder case
against Gaile Owens. From the
beginning, Mrs. Owens’ counsel
knew that this was her best—
indeed, her only—defense. Before
trial, her counsel told the trial
court that in his opinion: “This
case has a meritorious defense in
the battered-wife syndrome.”…
The Memphis district attorneys
obviously knew that this was the
defense theory. But this defense
was never developed or even
mentioned to the jury during
the trial because of the cover-up
of exculpatory evidence by the
Memphis prosecutor and the
complete failure of defense counsel
to conduct a proper investigation of
[Ronald] Owens’ sadistic behavior
toward his wife.
Judge Merritt wrote that Mrs. Owens
asked prior to trial for the prosecutor
to give her attorneys everything he had
that illustrated the fact of her husband’s
adulterous activities, including evidence
of his many mistresses and the affairs that
entailed sexual details such as fetishes
or perversions. Merritt’s opinion argues
that the routine and continual flaunting
of these acts to Mrs. Owens was enough
to contribute to her mindset. There were
two specific, sexually graphic letters
between Mr. Owens and Gayla Scott that
were repressed, with nicknames alluding
to oral sexual encounters. Merritt takes the
most offense to the prosecution’s “lying to
the trial court” by saying they had given
all of their evidence. They went so far as
to specify that they had given “any piece
of paper, any notebook—anything along
those lines, letters, and etc. that we have.”
Merritt accuses the majority of using
the logic that Mrs. Owens could have
presented this information herself, despite
the fact that a murder defendant is
naturally lacking in credibility and also
that the ruling of the majority is contrary
to Brady v. Maryland. “It is certainly true
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that the blatant prosecutorial misconduct

suppressing the love letters was
highly material and prejudicial at the
mitigation phase of the trial,” he wrote.
Regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel, Merritt argues that the majority’s
opinion was biased toward the State
“both as to the facts and the law.”
Merritt’s basic argument is that the
defense counsel failed in researching
and developing a defense. Not only did
it strip the defense of a better argument
to abandon the battered-wife strategy, it
severely weakened Owens’s motive. If it
were not a battered-wife or self defense
argument, the only remaining motive put
forth for her crime was “insurance money.”
Merritt argues that the decision fails
to comply with the Sixth Amendment and
the American Bar Association Guidelines
for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
Under those requirements, “counsel
must fully investigate all mitigating
circumstances, even when the defendant
does not want to take the stand or is not
forthcoming.” He accused the majority’s
use of the Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct.
1933, 1939 case as inadequate because
“[Owens] did not even refuse to cooperate,
much less instruct counsel not to put
on mitigating evidence.” Also, while
the majority attributed counsel’s measly
hours of investigation in preparation for
mitigation to under-billing, Merritt argues
that “counsel abandoned the investigation
of the defense,” because the attorney “had
no incentive to falsify his investigation.”
Merritt goes so far as to present
the evidence that the “counsel would
h ave f o u n d ” h a d t h ey p ro p e r l y
investigated the background. This
section is worth quoting in its entirety:
Ron Owens was abusive
toward Ms. Owens. He subjected
her to physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse beginning with
their wedding night when he was
forceful and impatient, demanding
sex immediately upon entering
their hotel room. When Ms. Owens
revealed to her new husband that
she was in great pain and bleeding
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profusely, he called her frigid, and angrily left
the hotel room stating that “If you won’t, I know
where I can find someone who will.”

There are many further horrors. Mr. Owens
inserted and broke a wine bottle inside Mrs. Owen’s
vagina, and also penetrated her with a “penisshaped marijuana pipe…which caused her pain
and humiliation.” Moreover, Mr. Owens forced his
wife to have sex the night before she gave birth, and
the “brutal sexual intercourse” caused the placenta
to “partially [detach].” An emergency C-section
was required for the safety of mother and child.
Mrs. Owens endured verbal and emotional abuse
as well. When their children were born, “Mr. Owens
accused Ms. Owens of not taking properly her birth
control pills and complained that the children would
be an unbearable financial burden.” He berated her
with comments such as, “she did not sweat much for
a fat person.” He was not only physically unfaithful,
but “also deceitful;” he lied to his wife as well as other
people about volunteering for service in Vietnam,
as well as being shot there [twice] and contracting
Malaria. He also falsified his educational background,
claiming to have a Bachelor’s degree. All of these factors
led, Merritt writes, to the sentence Owens received.

Gaile Owens and Feminist Theory
Before delving too deeply into the intricacies of this case,
it is interesting but probably not surprising to note that it
falls along political lines. The two judges in the majority
were appointed by conservative Presidents; Boggs was
appointed by Ronald Reagan and Siler by George H.W.
Bush. Justice Merritt, however, was nominated by
Carter, and it cannot be coincidence that they wrote
opinions that fit neatly with those conflicting ideologies.
As noted above, Gaile Owens managed to fit her
crime into the narrow guidelines that actually execute
women. She was immediately disadvantaged by the
aggravating circumstance of murder-for-hire. What she
was forced to argue after her conviction and sentencing,
then, was that mitigating factors should have been
enough to save her, and that her counsel had not
researched or presented that information in an effective
way. Thus, her case is really comprised of a push
and pull between mitigating and aggravating factors.
Though it would be too generous to argue that
Owens was unworthy of punishment, the majority’s
simple characterization of every claim against her
counsel as their choice of “strategy” seems a dubious
path to choose when a human life is what hangs in the
figurative balance of justice. At what point can courts
agree that it is possible for bad strategy to be ineffective
counsel? Rapaport’s vehemence that domestic crimes
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be elevated somewhat ignores the frequent and severe
domestic abuse that often leads women to retaliate
and seek revenge against their husbands. The
majority opinion does not give credence to Owens’s
claims of such violence, but I would argue that if even
half of her claims were true, it would warrant the
reduction from a death sentence to life without parole.
Moreover, my own personal argument is that
Mrs. Owens was punished because she simply does
not fit the female murderer stereotype, similar to
arguments by Heberle. She is outside conceptions
of traditional femininity, and instead fits the mold of
the aggressive murderer. The norm is a male killer,
but Owens’s unwillingness to cooperate is too stark
a contrast with the societal expectations of a female
killer, if they even exist — a weeping, terrified, and
apologetic female who loved her husband despite
the frequent beatings he gave her, and who shot
him to keep him from shooting her or their children.
The majority opinion places blame on Mrs. Owens
for taking control of her defense, something a woman
would not usually be expected to do, and also says
that she impeded her defense. While this might be
true, much of Owens’s problem seems to be that she,
like many other subjects of feminist theory, did not
know the proper course of action with respect to the
law. Her initial statement that a bad marriage was her
motive was soon supplemented with the instances in
which she suffered intense verbal and sexual abuse.
In a broad sense, this case is not only an implication
of two individuals whose relationship had gone sour, but
also the culture that allowed a situation to escalate to
the point of violence and murder. For Mrs. Owens, she
felt trapped by an empty marriage, but felt that the only
means of escape was to kill her husband. Is it because
the Owens lived in rural Tennessee that she felt divorce
was not an acceptable decision? Would her husband
have allowed it? Did she have a means of income if she
were to be granted a divorce? What sort of person kills
her husband because of a bad marriage? The majority
decided that such a person is one worthy of execution,
but I would argue that there could have been a more
gender-equal culture that provided options for Gaile
Owens before she was compelled to hire a hit man.

Conclusion
Victor Streib alluded to the fact that today, in the
current tangled climate of courts and endless appeals
and overworked attorneys, capital punishment is a
questionable practice at best. It is likely that many of
the people interested in the relationship between women
and the death penalty, such as myself, are critical of the
death penalty in general, and thus would avoid calls for
equality that might lead to more executions. This fact
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has probably kept a considerable number
of feminist writers away from the subject
in favor of topics on which they can
speak to inspire positive social change,
for example the difference in prosecution
of crack versus white powder cocaine.
Nonetheless, women on death row
provide, as I hope I have shown, another
thread of inequality. Though many women
are protected through this inequality, the
assumptions that put it in place—the
devaluing of domestic crime, for example—
are not necessarily results of positive views
of women. A long-ago acquaintance of my
stepmother killed her husband after years
of abuse and received only 18 months in
prison. It is hard, even for feminists, to
reverse this situation in their minds. It is
still a persistent belief that a woman cannot
abuse her husband, at least physically, and
if he committed murder in self-defense,
he would be laughed out of court, as well
as much more likely to receive a capital
sentence. It is my hope that capital
punishment and gender will come more
into the mainstream in the future as a key
example of the difficulty in establishing
and defining rights and also the struggle
to develop a system of rules or a singular
theory that will explain everything. If one
such theory existed, more feminists would
be writing about capital punishment.
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